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FOREWORD
As the Army downsizes its personnel while still being asked to conduct a wide variety of missions globally, the need for increased effectiveness is paramount.
Those interested in the possibilities presented by the
Army’s recently developed regionally aligned forces
(RAF) concept will find this monograph thoughtprovoking and of particular interest. While the United
States has long recognized the importance of “helping others help themselves,” the author contends that,
as Operation IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrated, U.S.
Army conventional forces continue to falter in the
realm of security force assistance. In a personnel and
budgetary constrained environment, doing more with
less will become more important, as will the need to
build partner capacity.
In this monograph, Captain (Promotable) Liam
Walsh, an infantry officer and veteran of both Iraq and
Afghanistan, seeks to answer how the Army’s principal tactical formation—the brigade combat team—can
best respond to this challenge and opportunity. Drawing upon extensive research into the Army’s advisory
efforts in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Captain Walsh
concludes that the Army must learn several key lessons in how it conducts security force assistance. Primary among these lessons is the imperative to get the
right personnel into advisory roles, the need to ensure
unity of effort between the operational and advisory
missions, and the need to optimize the brigade combat team for security force assistance if it is to conduct
that mission.
Captain Walsh examines the opportunities that
the brigade combat team currently has in conducting
security force assistance in today’s operating environ-
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ment. Drawing from the lessons of Iraq and current
national security strategy, the author advocates that
the brigade combat team can be a powerful force for
the combatant commanders in the realm of conflict
prevention, but that many of the lessons of Iraq are
at risk of being lost. He further argues that changes
should be made within the Army to make the brigade
combat team more effective at security force assistance
if tasked to conduct that mission.
The author provides five recommendations for the
Army to increase the effectiveness of brigade combat
teams when they are providing security force assistance. First, he calls for the Army to align the majority
of its brigade combat teams with geographic combatant commands, thereby allowing the brigades to focus
their training on a specific area of operations, while
providing the combatant commanders with a more effective product. Next, he suggests the Army should
reform its personnel policies to allow Soldiers to stay
primarily aligned with units in the combatant command with which they have experience, creating more
regional expertise and enabling enduring relationships with partner militaries. Third, he advocates for
aligning conventional forces with collocated Special
Forces Groups on military installations, creating the
conditions for continued interdependence between
the two, but also drawing on the inherent advisory capabilities found in Special Forces to help conventional
forces prepare for this mission. Fourth, he calls for the
creation of an “army advisor” corps, whose mission
would be to conduct tactical and operational advising
to host nation security forces, while also providing the
ability to embed in conventional units tasked to conduct security force assistance to increase their capacity for that mission. Finally, he calls for the permanent
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assignment of those “Army advisors” down to the
battalion level as a means to assist unit commanders to train host nation security forces, or to provide
stand-alone advisory packages if needed.
Captain Walsh’s work is timely and relevant and
provides an excellent example of a young officer looking at a strategic issue and drawing upon his or her
operational experience to try to provide recommendations to the U.S. Army as an institution. Those interested in the possibilities presented by the Army’s
recently developed regionally aligned forces concept
will find this monograph thought-provoking and of
particular interest. The Strategic Studies Institute
welcomes Captain Walsh’s contribution to the body
of literature on security force assistance and regional
alignment and highly recommends this work to those
interested in the advisory mission in Iraq, brigade
structure, and the regionally aligned forces concept.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
An examination of the U.S. Army’s security force
assistance efforts during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
reveals significant issues in effectively advising Iraqi
Security Forces due to several organizational and personnel shortcomings within the Army’s approach to
this crucial mission. The merging of the Army’s operational and advisory efforts at the core operational formation—the brigade combat team—occurred with the
advent of the Advise and Assist Brigade in 2009 and
resolved some of those issues operationally, but did
not fix the underlying structural issues in the Army.
In 2013, the Army began to examine a new way
of conducting business in the area of conflict prevention, looking to “engage regionally and respond globally.” The tool chosen for this strategy is the regionally
aligned forces (RAF) concept, which aligns various
units with the geographic combatant commands. One
potential mission for regionally aligned forces that
has the possibility of yielding substantial dividends is
security force assistance. By aligning units regionally,
particularly the brigade combat team, the Army could
greatly increase its ability to conduct security force assistance through building enduring relationships with
partner militaries and in gaining genuine regional
expertise in potential areas of conflict.
However, the security force assistance lessons
learned in Iraq currently are not operationalized to
their maximum level within the brigade combat team.
If regionally aligned brigade combat teams are to be
truly effective in future security force assistance missions, several changes must take place in how the
Army mans, trains, and equips its formations:
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•	First, the Army should expand regional alignment to the majority of its brigade combat
teams.
•	Second, the Army should change its personnel
management policies to ensure that soldiers
serving in regionally aligned units remain focused on a geographic theater for the majority
of their careers.
•	Third, the Army should institutionalize relations between regionally aligned Special Forces
Groups and conventional forces co-located on
installations.
•	
Fourth, the Army should create a distinct
“army advisor” functional area for officers and
noncommissioned officers to form a cadre of
experts in training foreign security forces at the
tactical and operational levels.
•	Fifth, the Army should modify the organization of the brigade combat team to increase its
security force assistance capacity by assigning
these Army Advisors down to the maneuver
battalion level.
As this monograph demonstrates, the previous
recommendations are not a cure-all for security force
assistance within the brigade combat team, but what
they do provide are possible means to develop more
effectively and efficiently the militaries of partner and
allied nations. By maximizing advising potential at
the brigade combat team and below, the Army will
be able to more effectively build partner capacity, to
develop enduring relationships with partner military
forces while gaining regional expertise at the tactical
and operational levels, to institutionalize Special Operations Forces and conventional forces interdepen-
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dence, and most importantly, to attain unity of effort
in the operational and advisory components of operations, while also getting the best soldiers suited for
advisor duty into those roles.
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ENABLING OTHERS TO WIN IN A
COMPLEX WORLD: MAXIMIZING SECURITY
FORCE ASSISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE
REGIONALLY ALIGNED BRIGADE
COMBAT TEAM
Liam Walsh
INTRODUCTION
Writing in Foreign Affairs in 2010, former Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates noted: “strategic reality demands that the U.S. government get better at what
is called ‘building partner capacity.’”1 Security force
assistance (SFA) is a central tenet of the military component of this strategy, which focuses on the tasks associated with SFA: organize, train, equip, rebuild and
build, and advise and assist.2 Defined as “activities that
contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to
support the development of the capacity and capability of FSF [foreign security forces] and their supporting institutions,” SFA enables U.S. advisors to achieve
strategic goals through the efforts of partner nations
and allies rather than through direct U.S. intervention.3 Additionally, as budgets tighten, focus within
the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Army in
particular, centers on the need to build partner capacity prior to the onset of conflict. Concentrating on the
“Prevent” and “Shape” phases of campaigns, in 2013
the Army chose to begin to regionally align its forces
in order to provide conventional forces to geographic
combatant commanders (GCCs) through a concept
called regionally aligned forces (RAF).
Security force assistance is more relevant in the
contemporary environment than ever before. By 2009,

1

Army doctrine recognized that “security force assistance is no longer an ‘additional duty.’ It is now a core
competency of our Army.”4 Building off this idea, the
2014 edition of the Army operating concept, titled Win
in a Complex World, stated that, in order to foster security, “the Army engages regionally and prepares to respond globally to compel enemies and adversaries.”5
This central tenet of regional engagement and global
responsiveness drives the RAF concept, as it recognizes that “Army forces are uniquely suited to shape
security environments through forward presence and
sustained engagements with allied and partnered land
forces.”6 An underlying principle among these themes
is the need for the United States to avoid prolonged
large-scale conflict and instead focus on building partner capacity for dealing with these issues, exemplified
in the recognition that “the diversity of threats to US
security and vital interests will increase the need for
Army forces to prevent conflict and shape security
environments.”7
The aim of this monograph is to examine the role
the U.S. Army plays in effectively enabling partner
and allied nations to provide for their own security,
thus preventing conflict if possible, and shaping it
toward toward U.S. interests if conflict should arise.
This monograph will focus at the tactical and operational levels of SFA—specifically looking at U.S. Army
formations at the brigade combat team (BCT) and below; these units of approximately 4,500 soldiers are
the deployable building block of the Army’s active
forces. Optimizing the ability of the BCTs to conduct
SFA while still retaining the warfighting capabilities
inherent to the organization is crucial if the Army is to
take on a larger role in building partner capacity and
conflict prevention. SFA efforts in Iraq proved that the
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Army could adapt to conduct SFA at the BCT level, albeit slowly and often inefficiently, in order to develop
Iraqi security forces (ISF) capable of defending Iraq
after Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) transitioned
to Operation NEW DAWN (OND) in September 2010.
This monograph’s chosen case study—OIF—will
focus solely on the U.S. Army’s training efforts with
the Iraqi army. Although the U.S. Marine Corps, as
well as elements of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force,
contributed significantly to the training of the Iraqi
army, Iraqi National Police, Iraqi Border Police, Iraqi
Special Operations Forces, and a myriad of other types
of units, the scope of this project will be to look at how
the U.S. Army attempted to train units most similar to
it—the conventional Iraqi army.
Additionally, this analysis recognizes there are
inherent contextual differences present in the OIF example and those of potential future SFA missions in
conditions other than major combat operations. However, these differences do not negate the importance
of understanding the institutional SFA shortcomings
and associated remedies that the situation in Iraq dictated the Army undertake. Army units train for decisive action through the simultaneous combination of
offensive, defensive, stability (or defense support of
civil authorities) operations and then begin focused
training upon receipt of a specific mission.8 Similarly,
there is great value in learning from the lessons of SFA
development and execution during OIF, an effort that
saw continuous changes to the mix of offensive, defensive, and security operations, despite the fact that
the Army is not likely to undertake another large-scale
stability operation in the future. Even if future operating environments are not replications of the conditions
found in OIF, there is value institutionally in looking
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at how the Army adapted to SFA in Iraq, and in noting
that shortcomings still exist in the BCT for this crucial
mission.
SFA efforts during OIF teach us several major lessons about how to be effective in this type of mission.
Primary among these lessons is the inherent need to
attain unity of effort between the advisory mission
and combat mission, the need to specially select, train,
and employ soldiers best suited for service as advisors early in the brigade’s cycle for deployment, and
the need to adapt the organization to maximize effectiveness for SFA. Yet, current Army policy continues to treat SFA as an “add-on” mission for the BCT,
negating the fact that, as Army policy states, conflict
prevention is the area the Army will focus on in the
future. Analyzing strengths and weaknesses of the
U.S. Army’s SFA effort with the Iraqi army allows for
best practices to be applied to future SFA efforts the
Army may take part in—particularly should RAF at
the brigade level and below find themselves ordered
to conduct security force assistance.
THE RELEVANCE OF SFA IN THE
CONTEMPORARY OPERATING
ENVIRONMENT
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) emphasizes three pillars for DoD’s defense strategy: protect the homeland; build security globally; project
power and win decisively.9 Of the 11 DoD missions
the Army has a role in, SFA is directly tied to three:
provide a global stabilizing presence; conduct military
engagement and security cooperation; and conduct
stability and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.10
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The 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG)
helps shape how the Army sees the strategic environment that drove the decision to turn toward RAF.
Examining the desired end state of operations—the
termination of conflict—the ASPG states, “Effective
conflict termination must establish security and stability among populations, which requires knowledge
and influence on their cultural, political and economic
relationships.”11 The key point here, and one learned
at great cost during OIF, OND, and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), is that knowledge of
culture and effective relationships are central to successful mission accomplishment in today’s operating
environment. This rationale shapes and justifies the
Army’s regional alignment of forces in order to meet
the basic and enabling roles.
The Army accomplishes its mission through the
conduct of two basic roles and four enabling roles. The
Army’s basic roles are to deter/defeat threats on land
and to control land areas and their populations.12 The
organization, size, and capabilities of the Army make
it the only branch of the Joint Force that can achieve
these roles over a sustained period on land. The
Army’s enabling roles are support to security cooperation, support to domestic civil authorities, entry
operations, and Army support to other services, the
Joint Force, and the DoD.13 SFA falls primarily under
support to security cooperation. The manner in which
the Army will conduct this increased engagement is
by maintaining a regional presence, building partner
capacity and alliances, and providing the Joint Force
with essential enablers for rapid contingency response
if and when needed. The Army relies on two supporting concepts for this strategy—RAF and mission
tailored forces (MTF).
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The Army defines RAF as:
[original in bold] those Army units assigned and allocated to combatant commands, as well as those capabilities that are service retained (but aligned to a
Combatant Command (CCMD) and prepared by the
Army for regional missions.14

RAF includes total army organizations (Active Duty,
National Guard, Army Reserves) and also capabilities
that are forward deployed, operating in a combatant
command area of responsibility, supporting the combatant command from outside the area of responsibility, and those prepared to support from outside the
area of responsibility.
Key to the RAF concept is that combatant command requirements drive regional missions, and this
will require that RAF have understanding of cultures,
geography, languages, and militaries of the countries
in which they are most likely to operate, as well as
expertise in how to impart military knowledge and
skills to others.15 The goal of regional alignment is to
provide the combatant commanders with “predictable, task-organized, and responsive capabilities” to
achieve their missions and other requirements across
the full range of military operations, to include joint
task force-capable headquarters, crisis or contingency
response, operations support, theater security cooperation, and bilateral or multilateral military exercises.16
A byproduct of increasing regional knowledge within
units is that Army units tasked to conduct SFA under the RAF concept will have a greater knowledge
of their counterparts, their language, customs, and
region, and thus can be expected to serve more effectively in an advisory role.
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Additionally, the Army cites that regional alignment will provide for more effective approaches for
nontraditional threats in an “increasingly interdependent security environment” by training soldiers and
growing leaders who can adapt to changing conditions across the range of military operations.17 Part of
this is that the Army sees RAF as one way to build sustainable capacity in partners and allies because forces
organized under the concept will support enduring
combatant commander requirements for military engagement, thus strengthening relationships and providing “consistent and committed interaction.”18 As
will be examined later, the importance of enduring
relationships is key in working with partner nations.
The other supporting concept outlined in the 2014
ASPG is that of mission tailored forces (MTF). MTF
complement RAF in meeting combatant commander
requirements, but have distinctly different and specific roles and missions such as the global response
force (GRF), defeating anti-access/area denial threats,
countering weapons of mass destruction, Army cyberspace forces, conventional Army habitual support to
other services or special operations forces for specified
missions, and combat operations to decisively defeat
a threat.19
With this understanding of how the Army sees
itself filling its role within current national security
strategy, this monograph will next examine a case
study of the largest SFA mission the Army has undertaken since Vietnam—OIF. By tracing the development of the SFA mission in Iraq from 2003-10, it is
possible to identify institutional and organizational
shortcomings in how the Army conducts SFA, especially at the brigade combat team level.
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SFA IN IRAQ 2003-10
The catastrophic effects of the early American decision to disband the Iraqi army were further compounded as OIF progressed by advisory efforts best
described as ad hoc, disjointed, inefficient, and lacking proper attention and resources. At the beginning
of the war, there were very limited efforts to build
the Iraqi army, as it fell victim to the extreme levels
of “de-Baathification” underlying American policy.
It was not until February 2005, when the George W.
Bush administration developed a strategy contingent
on turning security quickly over to the Iraqis, that
significant efforts at SFA began. In response, General
George Casey, commander of Multinational ForcesIraq (MNF-I) called to raise the number of American
advisors in Iraq to 2,600—more than doubling their
presence.20 Yet, no consolidated training program for
deploying advisors was created until 2006, and even
then, no system existed within the Army’s personnel
management bureaucracy to ensure selection of the
best people suited to serve as advisors.
Separate chains of command for advisors and operational units created unity of effort problems, and
the focus remained on the conventional Army forces
until 2009, when the Army decided to merge the advisory effort into the BCT, creating the Advise and Assist Brigade. This augmented formation fixed many of
the inherent issues in SFA efforts in Iraq and led to
continued success under OND, with the United States
taking a back seat to the Iraqi military, although recent
events and the collapse of the Iraqi army in the face
of opposition in 2014 call into question the long-term
effectiveness of this campaign.
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Although there are many lessons to be learned in
examining the Army’s SFA efforts in OIF, it must be
noted that this example occurred in a war-torn country
that the United States had invaded and defeated. With
this, the United States deployed significant amounts
to troops and spent billions of dollars working to rebuild Iraq. Therefore, the OIF SFA model is not readily transportable to assisting U.S. partners that are
not in the middle of a war. Additionally, much of the
contemporary turmoil in Iraq must be attributed to
forces well outside the Army’s purview—principally
the Iraqi government’s inability to reconcile with its
Sunni population. However, there are many lessons
of the SFA experience in OIF, particularly focusing on
BCT structure, that are worth examining in depth and
provide ample opportunities for application in environments more permissive than that of war-torn Iraq.
Troubled Beginnings: 2003-06.
In June 2003, the operational command in Iraq, Coalition Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF7), created the Coalition
Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT), manned
primarily by contractors, to train ISF.21 The initial plan
called for U.S. Special Operations Forces to train 500
Iraqi commandos and for CMATT to establish nine
light brigades for the new Iraqi army.22 Concurrently,
conventional U.S. units began to train paramilitary
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps units at the company level
to assist in providing law and order.23
In June 2004, after a year of “indirection and collapse,” CMATT became incorporated under the newly
formed Multinational Security Transition CommandIraq (MNSTC-I), led by then-Lieutenant General
David Petraeus.24 The establishment of MNSTC-I
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coincided with the creation of Multinational CorpsIraq (MNC-I), which handled tactical matters, while
MNSTC-I was responsible for the creation of Iraqi Security Forces. This occurred concurrently with CJTF7
being split into two commands—MNC-I for daily
operations, and MNF-I, which oversaw the strategic
direction of the war. While intended to raise the priority of building ISF, the creation of separate operational
and advisor commands also created a split command
structure that would make unity of effort difficult to
achieve.
Petraeus soon replaced the contractors leading the
advisory effort with soldiers; however, many were
“inadequately prepared for their role as advisors.”25
At the time, there were only 39 “advisor support
teams” (AST) in Iraq to carry out the training of the
ISF.26 Of the ASTs, Major General Schwitters, the commander of CMATT, felt that only a third of the teams
were effective, noting that “nothing” had been done to
prepare them for their duties.27
Indicative of the level of dysfunction in the advisory effort early in the war, one AST leader, who deployed to Iraq in March 2004 expecting to set up an
Iraqi basic training facility, eventually found himself
embedded with his Iraqi army trainees during the first
Battle of Fallujah in November 2004.28 Outlining the
role that elements of one reserve division played when
they deployed to Iraq in 2004, the commander of the
U.S. Army Reserve Command stated, “I thought the
98th [Division] would essentially do a training base
kind of thing. But what actually happened was that
many of these outstanding soldiers found themselves
embedded inside Iraqi units.”29
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At the time of MNSTC-I’s creation, nine Iraqi battalions existed; Petraeus’s task was to build 10 Iraqi
divisions as quickly as possible.30 Compounding this
daunting challenge, MNSTC-I had to fight for personnel to man its staff, relying heavily on reservists and
individuals plucked from units already in Iraq.31 Simultaneously, in June 2004 MNC-I tasked conventional Army units to train the two existing brigades of the
Iraqi National Guard to replace the Iraqi Civil Defense
Corps.32 Army units became increasingly involved in
the training of ISF by creating ad hoc training teams
they provided from within their own ranks, while also
“partnering” with ISF to eventually conduct combined
operations together. By November 2004, over 1,100
transition team members—sourced predominantly
from the units already on the ground—were serving
in Iraq.33 Yet, despite the creation of MNSTC-I, little
unity of effort existed, and units essentially developed
their own programs and manned their own advisor
units to train the Iraqi army.
During the 2004-06 period, advisors assigned to
Military Transition Teams (MiTT) in Iraq were both
sourced internally by operational units already in theater, and sourced externally by officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) selected to serve on transition teams by the Army. Disparate training, however,
resulted in the teams having great levels of experience, but mostly forged through on the job training,
rather than institutional training on advising.34 Heavy
reliance initially went to Army Reserve and National
Guard units, and then the efforts shifted to manpower
that land-owning BCTs could provide themselves for
the advisory mission. Multiple studies of transition
teams, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, concluded that
these teams were too small for the tasks that they have
been assigned.35
11

Doctrinally, MiTTs were 11-man teams advising
Iraqi army units at the division, brigade, and battalion
levels. They were normally attached to U.S. land-owning units, usually at the brigade or battalion—although
the size of the teams frequently varied as subordinate
elements in the BCT were often reorganized in support of the MiTTs. Administratively, the Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG) controlled the teams, while the
conventional land-owning units managed them tactically.36 MiTTs consisted of officers and senior NCOs
from across combat arms and support branches, responsible for not only training and advising the Iraqi
forces, but also for ensuring the Iraqi army had access
to American enablers such as fire support and medical
evacuation assets. In theory, a brigade-level MiTT was
led by a combat arms lieutenant colonel, with a combat arms major as his maneuver trainer, and then an
officer and NCO team in specialty areas such as intelligence, logistics, fire support, communications, and
medical support.37 At the battalion level, the trainers
dropped to a corresponding rank—generally led by a
captain and made up mostly of company grade officers
and staff sergeants through sergeants first class, while
at the division, the sourcing went up, as colonels led
division MiTTs. Therefore, in theory the MiTTs had
the expertise to train and advise the Iraqi army, while
also possessing the tactical skills needed to bring U.S.
enablers to bear in support of the Iraqi army.
By 2005, as the situation in Iraq deteriorated, the
U.S. plan became to transition security responsibilities
quickly to the Iraqis—as President Bush summarized,
“as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.”38 This
hopeful strategy was designed “to keep a lid on Iraq
until such time as newly created Iraqi forces could
take over the fight.”39 Correspondingly, advisory
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efforts rapidly increased. Casey requested forces for
the advisory effort in 2005, calling for an additional
1,505 dedicated trainers, representing a demand of
over five BCTs worth of captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels, as well as a host of senior NCOs; this
came at a time when the Army already had 20 BCTs
committed to the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan and
another 15 preparing to rotate in.40 Facing significant
demand for officers and senior NCOs, the Army had
to rely on the piecemeal tasking of individuals to cobble together advisor teams, ignoring factors such as
cohesion among the teams or an individual’s disposition toward being able to work across cultures with
Iraqi counterparts.
The establishment of MNSTC-I did show, however, that the Army was willing to put resources toward organizing, training, and equipping an Iraqi
army, albeit not without flaws. Casey optimistically
set November 30, 2005, as the date to transition security responsibilities to Iraqi control at the provincial
level. MNSTC-I became the main effort in Iraq, with
U.S. forces taking a back seat to the ISF, instead focusing mainly on counterterrorism.41 The assumption
that, only 18 months after its establishment, MNSTCI could effectively train an Iraqi force capable of assuming responsibility for all of Iraq seems naïve in
hindsight. This point was driven home in the failed
attempt in July 2006 to implement the first Baghdad
Security Plan, Operation TOGETHER FORWARD,
when several Iraqi Army units simply did not show
up.42 Despite U.S. plans and institutional commitment
to turn security over to the ISF, the Iraqis simply were
not prepared.
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Transition Teams in the “Surge”: 2007-08.
Recognizing inconsistency in the training of advisors, in June 2006 the Army, Air Force, and Navy consolidated advisory team training at Fort Riley, KS, under the command of the Army’s 1st Infantry Division;
the Marines established their own transition training
center at 29 Palms, CA. Sensing the urgency of this
mission, the Army allocated the combat power of the
1st Infantry Division’s entire headquarters and the
leadership of two of its brigades to oversee the training.43 Those selected to MiTTs underwent 60 days of
training at Fort Riley, focused on individual skills, advisor skills, collective tasks, and culture, as well as 40
hours of language training.44 Additionally, the Deputy
Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division
was made the commander of the IAG, responsible
for the administrative control of all transition teams
deployed to Iraq.45 The Army G3, Lieutenant General
James Lovelace, testified to Congress in 2006 that he
considered resourcing the transition teams to be the
Army’s top manning priority.46 There is some credence
to this claim, as one class of majors graduating from
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
in late-2006 saw 18 percent of its graduates assigned
directly to transition teams.47 However, the demands
of the war dictated that many top performers were assigned to combat units, and advisor teams often were
assigned those soldiers who had not yet deployed, as
the Army had to relieve the stress on those soldiers
that had deployed repeatedly to Iraq or Afghanistan.
This is not to say, however, that the Fort Riley
training program was a cure-all to fix SFA efforts.
COIN expert Dr. John Nagl, whose last assignment
in the Army from 2006-08 was commanding one of
the battalions at Fort Riley tasked with training U.S.
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advisors, stated he “was furious at the ad-hockery that
underlay everything the Army was doing in advisor
selection and training.”48 Nagl’s criticism’s centered
on what amounted to strategic miscalculations. According to him, the Army was selecting the wrong
people to serve as advisors (focusing on those who
had not been in combat rather than the most talented
who had); additionally, it was conducting training in
the wrong place (the prairie of Kansas rather than the
desert of Fort Irwin, CA). Furthermore, the Army was
training advisors with the wrong people (tank drivers
instead of Green Berets). Then the Army disbanded
the trained, battle-tested advisor teams after their
year-long deployment, only to create new ones from
scratch to replace them.49
Higher echelon MiTTs (brigade and division) were
predominantly filled with senior leaders centrally
selected by the Army for advisory duty. These “external” teams received formal training—as the teams
were formed and trained together at Fort Riley and
then trained in Kuwait and Iraq prior to attachment to
U.S. forces in theater. While these MiTTs often trained
in a focused manner on advising skills and had good
internal cohesion, they were attached to BCTs with
whom they had no prior experience, resulting in the
need to develop relationships between the MiTT and
the BCT.50 Additionally, despite the importance of
training the ISF by 2008, only half of the 14 division
MiTTs were augmented with a standard MiTT, showing that even though these teams had the top manning priority, getting advisors into place remained a
challenge.51
The battalion-level MiTTs, those conducting tactical advising, were frequently internally sourced by
members of the U.S. battalion responsible for an area
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of operations. Although this led to good relationships
between the transition team and the conventional
land-owning unit, it also created several problems.
First, these MiTTs often received scant advisor training—usually a rotation at one of the combat training
centers, and then attendance at the Phoenix Academy at Camp Taji upon arrival in Iraq. The Phoenix
Academy (later to become the COIN academy) was
designed to serve as the transition team “finishing
school” for MiTTs that trained together at Fort Riley,
not as a stand-alone training program.52 Additionally,
internally sourced teams were “created out of hide”
and required the sourcing unit to lose a disproportionate number of senior NCOs and key officers for this
mission, making it difficult to replace those leaders.
Battalion MiTTs often conducted combat operations
with their ISF partners, creating additional challenges. Conducting assessments of Iraqi army units in the
field required the MiTT to organize itself for a combat
patrol—a daunting task for an 11-member team, as the
minimum manning requirements for most U.S. patrols was 12 soldiers, and giving credence to the claim
that the advisory teams were too small for the tasks
they completed.53 Many battlespace owning BCTs and
battalions therefore had to provide U.S. platoons under operational control of the MiTTs to facilitate their
freedom of movement, further exacerbating the ad
hoc nature of the MiTTs.54
The descent of Iraq into sectarian civil war from
2006-07 took its toll on the advisory effort, as the focus
of MNSTC-I’s efforts remained the creation of Iraqi
combat units, at the expense of institutional capacity, logistics, and other structural building blocks.55
Leader development in the ISF also took a back seat.
Despite these challenges, by summer 2007, MNSTC-I
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had created over 150,000 soldiers in the Iraqi army,
and the units’ performance had increased.56 Colonel
Peter Mansoor, Executive Officer for General Petraeus
from 2007-08, highlighted that “Six thousand advisors
were embedded in five hundred military and policy
advisory teams that were themselves increasingly better trained and able to assist Iraqi units.” 57 It should
be noted, however, that this was at a time when over
160,000 U.S. forces were deployed to Iraq; this means
that less than 4 percent of the force was dedicated to
training the ISF. The urgency of the “surge” required
U.S. units to take on the bulk of securing the Iraqi population, while the ongoing development of the ISF did
not receive the same level of emphasis and resourcing
as did the additional five “surge” BCTs sent to Iraq.
While efforts to secure Iraq from 2006-08 certainly
achieved impressive results, the advisory campaign
remained relatively ad hoc during this crucial phase
of the war.
The Advise and Assist Brigade, 2009-10.
In September 2009, the Army relieved the 1st Infantry Division of its responsibility for training advisors,
and the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade at Fort Polk,
LA, was activated and assumed the mission. For the
first time since the war began, an institutional command was dedicated to the training of advisors and
transition teams. With this change, the 1st Infantry
Division resumed its traditional role, and the 162nd
fell in on the resources of the massive Joint Readiness
Training Center at Fort Polk.
The 162nd conducted its advisor training program
in four blocks: a 10-day Advisor Course for Augmented Advisors, Warrior/Deployment Task Training, a
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3-day Tactical Leader Seminar, and a 3-day Advisor/
FSF Staff exercise.58 This also enabled the 162nd to
train and evaluate advisor teams as they conducted
their Mission Rehearsal Exercise at Fort Polk or Fort
Irwin, CA, certifying the teams prior to their deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Additionally, this change
turned the Iraqi Assistance Group and the advisory
effort over to MNC-I on June 3, 2009; finally placing
the advisory and operational commands in Iraq under one roof.59 The 162nd also formed Mobile Training
Teams that could travel to Army installations to train
deploying units on a variety of SFA functions, including language skills, Islamic culture, roles of the advisor and negotiation techniques, leader engagements,
and many other areas relevant to advisors.60
More importantly, the Army changed its approach
to SFA in a significant way—both in the advisor teams
and in the BCTs. The centerpiece of this change was
the publishing of Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1, Security
Force Assistance, in May 2009. The central operational
change in this construct was that MiTTs and other
transition teams were no longer to be attached to the
BCT. The BCT would now be seen as the modular
brigade augmented for security force assistance (MBSFA, more commonly known as the Advise and Assist
Brigade, or AAB). Under this concept, the BCT would
gain a large component of advisors upon receipt of
an SFA mission, therefore shifting the priorities from
transition teams supporting BCTs to the BCT itself becoming the transition team.
To facilitate this change, an AAB received up to a
48-person augmentation in the form of four colonels,
20 lieutenant colonels, and 24 majors.61 These individuals would be assigned temporarily to the BCT
upon receipt of an SFA mission and would be task-
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organized into Stability Transition Teams (S-TTs) that
would work hand and hand with the BCT’s maneuver
battalions. This meant that the S-TTs were embedded
in the maneuver units and advised the ISF, providing them with coalition support when needed, and
providing coalition forces with situational awareness
of ISF operations and progress, while conventional
forces at the squad through battalion level partnered
with their Iraqi counterparts (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Traditional BCT vs. AAB.62
In the spring of 2009, the 4th BCT, 1st Armored
Division deployed to Iraq, serving as a “proof of concept” for the AABs. By August 2010, seven AABs were
serving in Iraq as the last “combat” BCT redeployed
to the United States.63 Highlighting the importance of
the shift to an advisory capacity within the BCT itself,
a former AAB commander commented:
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leaders quickly discovered that security force assistance requires a different mind-set and focus from
the traditional counterinsurgency mission of previous tours. We could no longer define our success by
the number of insurgents we detained. . . . Rather, the
quality of the host nations’ security forces we left behind ultimately defined the success of our campaign.64

With the development of the AAB, the Army finally achieved unity of effort between its advisory
missions and the major unit on the ground, the BCT.
By linking the BCT to the transition effort, another
AAB commander noted that “mindset shift” occurred
within the AAB’s, where the “ISF are our battlespace”
and the “entire organization of the brigade is in support of the S-TT.”65
On September 1, 2010, OIF transitioned to OND,
marking the official end of combat operations by U.S.
forces in Iraq. Under OND, six AABs remained in Iraq
to conduct stability operations, focusing on advising,
assisting, and training the ISF.66 This became the U.S.
military mission in Iraq until the end of 2011, when
the United States, unable to negotiate a new status of
forces agreement with Baghdad, withdrew the last of
its military forces from Iraq. The hard-learned lessons
of SFA within the BCT learned during the 2003-10
period became, at least temporarily, institutionalized
within the AAB. As focus within the U.S. Government
shifted to the war in Afghanistan, the AAB structure
changes eventually found themselves present in the
SFA Transition Team (SFATT). Yet, once units redeployed to the United States, training focus and organization completely shifted away from SFA, running the
risk of failing to institutionalize the lessons learned in
training FSF.
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ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED
Reviewing the lessons learned in the Army’s attempts at SFA in Iraq from 2003-10, there are several
key takeaways that must be considered in future SFA
operations. Primary among these lessons is the imperative to get the right personnel into training and
advisory missions; the need to ensure that unity of
effort, particularly between the BCT and advisors, is
considered in all aspects of operations; and the need
to optimize the BCT for SFA missions.
Personnel: Getting the Right People
in the Right Place.
Army doctrine recognizes that “not every Soldier is
well-suited to perform advisory functions; even those
considered to be the best and most experienced have
failed at being an advisor.”67 Consequently, the Army
lists 16 personality traits of the advisor, including
such subjective traits such as tolerance for ambiguity,
warmth in human relations, tolerance for differences,
and a sense of humor, as well as outlining two subcategories of advisor-specific skills: enabling, or working across cultures, building rapport, and negotiation;
and developing—teaching, coaching, and advising.68
Despite the lessons of Iraq, current Army personnel strategies remain rooted in “an industrial age approach” in which it is impossible to identify relevant
talents or experiences for advisory duty.69 Due to the
Army’s assignment and evaluation systems, there is
no way to identify those who possess the attributes of
successful advisors outside of prior service as an advisor. Additionally, it took several years for the Army to
ensure that those officers selected as advisors would
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have the duty seen as a career enhancing assignment.
Casey, then the Army Chief of Staff, stated in 2008, “I
want to ensure that the officers that lead these teams
are recognized and given the credit they deserve.”70
As Nagl noted, this decision played a major role in
helping ensure the right people filled advisory roles,
as majors who led transition teams were given “key
and developmental credit” required to advance in
rank, and lieutenant colonels and colonels were selected for advisory duty by a centralized board, similar to the process for selection of battalion and brigade
command.71
A question raised by the U.S. SFA effort in Iraq
is how detrimental the ad hoc creation of transition
teams was to their ability to create effective Iraqi forces. Some have noted that review of the Army’s advisory efforts throughout history reveals that the Army’s:
primary method of selecting advisors for nearly 100
years has been the ‘hey you’ system. With the exception of SF [Special Forces] and FAO [Foreign Area Officer] selection, there appears to be no clear method for
selecting the best qualified advisors.72

Similar to criticisms of the advisory effort in Vietnam
being “the Other War,” some have come to criticize
the Army’s efforts in Iraq as having repeated some of
the same mistakes.73 Additionally, personalities matter when trying to work effectively between transition
teams and BCTs, especially at the senior leader level.74
However, it was not until the development of the AAB
that advisor teams and BCTs trained together (albeit
usually only for a short period) prior to deployment.
The ad hoc creation and manning of advisor teams impaired not only team internal dynamics, but also relations with the BCT they would be attached to.
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The Army must therefore place emphasis on
identifying and selecting the right type of people to
serve as advisors, ensuring the duty helps advance
their careers so that advisor duty attracts the best
and brightest. Additionally, the Army must get these
advisors into the BCT as early as possible to ensure
effective relationships exist between the BCT and the
advisory teams if the Army truly wants to ensure that
the successes of the AAB will continue in future SFA
endeavors.
Organization: Unity of effort.
The decision to create specialized elements in the
form of an operational command (MNC-I) and an institutional command (MNSTC-I) in Iraq often created
stove-piped information chains and disrupted unity
of effort between the operational and advisory missions. Similar effects were felt in tactical and operational units, as this bifurcated chain of command required increased command and control requirements,
allowed for multiple units operating in the same area
of operations, and created competition for resources.75
Once deployed to theater, the MiTTs fell under the
administrative control of the IAG, which oversaw all
team training and reporting requirements on ISF progress.76 The IAG determined team assignments; oversaw personnel management such as replacements,
evaluations, and awards; identified new equipment
requirements for the teams; and oversaw property accountability.77 A problem with this alignment is that,
while under the administrative control of the IAG, the
MiTTs were attached to conventional BCTs, creating
fractured information chains—similar to the examples
of MNC-I and MNSTC-I at the theater level. For externally sourced MiTTs, this often led to problems with
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determining who was to provide them with administrative and logistical support. While a responsibility
of the IAG, it became more of a reality that the BCTs
should take on this task due to their physical proximity with one another.
A bigger issue existed in the fact that the BCTs, with
their ISF counterpart, “owned” the terrain in which
the MiTTs operated. This could create tension between
advisors and U.S. BCTs about operations conducted
with the ISF. Conventional U.S. Army units often
partnered with Iraqi army units at the squad, platoon,
and company levels, conducting combined operations
together, but the land-owning organization retained
operational authority over what occurred in an area
of operations until the advent of the AAB. MiTT advisors, concerned with the effectiveness and development of the Iraqi Army, worked from a separate set
of priorities from their land-owning counterparts,
whose primary concern was the security of the Iraqi
population. Just as information became stove-piped
in the division between MNC-I and MNSTC-I, the
same occurred at lower levels, as American platoons
partnered with Iraqi platoons often had no real way
of reporting the real effectiveness of Iraqi small units
in combat, since the 11-man MiTTs were very limited
in what they could do operationally. Even under the
AAB, challenges existed in assigning a large number
of field grade officers to conventional units they had
never worked with until just prior to deployment to
Iraq. This led to the potential for personality clashes
among brigade and advisor team leaders, and at lower levels could lead to confusion as to what was the
main effort.
The key lesson is that, in order to achieve unity
of effort, the advisory effort needs to be completely
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imbedded at the BCT and below—thus optimizing
the organization for SFA. While in theory the AAB
achieved this, in reality the addition of a large contingent of field grade officers a few months before deployment was not a total fix. In order to truly achieve
unity of effort, advisors would need to work seamlessly with conventional units down to the company
and platoon levels much earlier in their training cycle
for deployment, and leaders at all levels very early on
would need to define the relationships and command
and support structures between the two missions.
SFA in OIF Conclusions.
In diagraming the arc of SFA efforts in OIF, it is
apparent that two themes—getting the right people
into advisory roles and achieving unity of effort between the advisory effort and land-owning units—are
critical for effective development of FSF. The Army’s
SFA effort in Iraq provides three key imperatives to be
applied to future operations:
1. The BCT is likely to remain the baseline formation for the Army; advisory efforts must therefore be
tailored to fit within the BCT structure to improve
unity of command and effectiveness. Experience with
the AAB in Iraq proved the formation to be adequate
to conduct both major operations and SFA.
2. Ad hoc creation of advisor teams must be avoided in the future, and advisory teams should be incorporated into the BCT, similar to the AAB model in
Iraq. Care should be taken to avoid creating separate
commands such as MNC-I and MNSTC-I. Permanently assigning advisors to brigades would be a possible
organizational change that could improve SFA efforts
at the lowest levels.
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3. Army personnel management processes must be
modified to better identify service members possessing the skills and attributes for SFA outlined in FM
3-07.1. Service as an advisor must be incentivized and
not be seen as a competitive assignment that will not
detract from future command opportunities.
These lessons will drive the following sections of
this monograph as it examines how the Army can
best apply the lessons from SFA in Iraq to future operations while recognizing that future SFA efforts are
very likely to occur in circumstances much different
from those of Iraq. As the Army seeks to “Prevent”
and “Shape” the future conflict environment, it must
get better at SFA at the lowest level if units deployed
in support of RAF missions are to be effective and to
apply the hard-learned lessons of training FSF that we
can draw from OIF.
THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT, RAF,
AND THE BCT
Illustrating the potential that RAF can play in SFA
for combatant commanders, General David Rodriguez, Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), noted how the Army’s first regionally aligned
brigade, the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team
(ABCT), 1st Infantry Division, took part in multiple
missions to train FSF. 2/1 ABCT elements trained a
battalion from Malawi to serve in Congo, trained
Chadian and Guinean peacekeepers to serve in Mali,
conducted first aid training with Rwandan Defense
Forces, trained Burundi forces in counter-improvised
explosive device (IED) skills, and trained Kenyan Defense forces in unmanned aerial vehicle operations.78
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Additionally, an infantry company from the brigade
served as the East African Response Force and was
ready to respond to the terror attack on the Westgate
Shopping Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, although was ultimately not deployed.79 At the end of the first RAF
deployment, elements of the brigade had conducted
over 160 missions in 30 countries.80
The merits of the Army using aligned BCTs in SFA
is therefore not in question—being able to provide
forces to combatant commanders to meet their mission needs also coincides with the missions asked of
the Army via the various national security documents
that make up U.S. strategy. As noted in Foreign Policy,
“it’s always Phase Zero somewhere,” and thus, regionally aligned Army forces have a role to play.81 The
crux of the RAF concept is getting the BCT involved
in the “Prevent” and “Shape” phases of its “PreventShape-Win” strategy. One key mission the BCT can
bring to combatant commanders is SFA.
One helpful model to view the role of the BCT in
conducting SFA is found in the U.S. Army Special
Operations Command’s (USASOC) Operating Concept
2022 (See Figure 2). Not surprisingly, USASOC envisions itself in the lead in most operations to the left
of conventional military operations, such as foreign
internal defense (FID), unconventional warfare, and
counterterrorism. Where this analysis is truly interested is in the middle ground, where USASOC highlights
the role of counterinsurgency, SFA and FID, and the
interplay of SOF and conventional forces (CF). In this
“engagement” phase, there is clearly a role for both
conventional BCTs and SOF to play, especially given
that it aligns with national security strategy emphasizing the military’s role in conflict prevention. The
question, therefore, becomes one of how conventional
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forces, particularly at the BCT level and below, can
become more adept at these types of missions.

Figure 2. USASOC Future Force Development
Process.82
While this operating concept provides an excellent model for envisioning future campaigns and
highlights the absolute necessity of SOF and CF interdependence, it is not without flaws. First, it overemphasizes the role that SOF can play, given the size
and nature of SOF. One of the SOF fundamentals is
that “SOF cannot be mass produced.”83 Therefore, a
breaking point will be reached if SOF alone conducts
SFA, thus necessitating the role of CF in this mission.
USASOC also envisions SOF pulling critical enablers
from the BCTs such as medical experts, intelligence
assets, transportation assets, and others, which would
critically degrade the BCT’s ability to conduct its own
operations. This hits at the heart of the lessons learned
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conducting SFA in Iraq—Army BCTs must get better
at conducting SFA so that they can conduct effective
building of FSF without depending on SOF. Finally,
there is a legitimate concern that the levels of SOF/CF
interdependence experienced in OIF and OEF could
atrophy because “security cooperation and security
force assistance lack the forcing functions of combat
that occurred consistently over the past decade.”84
It is also necessary to examine existing programs
in the Army focused on SFA and Security Cooperation
and to draw lessons from those operations as well as
the lessons of Iraq. A well-known case study at the
tactical level exists in Army Special Forces conducting
FID missions—a core competency of the Green Berets
since their founding in the earliest stages of the Vietnam War, while the National Guard’s State Partnership Program, formed in the 1990s to develop cooperative, mutually beneficial relationships with partner
nations also provides an excellent example of effective
relationship building and the importance that plays in
working with partner militaries.
FID has long been a core competency of Army
SOF. Yet, it is important to note that FID and SFA
are not one and the same, as “SFA and DoD FID are
both subsets of SC [Security Cooperation], but neither
SFA nor FID are subsets of one another, because SFA
activities serve purposes beyond internal defense.”85
The focus on all U.S. FID efforts is to support the host
nation’s Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)
strategy, which is ideally a preemptive plan of action.86 A more significant difference in FID and SFA
is their scale. Forces conducting SFA theoretically can
build FSF from the ground up, whereas FID focuses on
existing forces defending against an internal threat.87
Nevertheless, while not the same doctrinally, a SOF
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approach to FID can provide valuable lessons into
how conventional forces can conduct SFA.
An important factor when addressing Army Special Forces is that they possess unique functional skills
inherent in their organization from the 12-man Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha level up,
including cultural understanding and language skills,
regional focus, and perhaps most important, core advising skills in working with other militaries. These
factors made SOF the de facto forces for FID dating
back to the Richard Nixon Doctrine of U.S. military
assistance to host nations with the caveat that they
provide the preponderance of forces for their own
self-defense.88 This role was further solidified in the
Sam Nunn-William Cohen amendment to the Barry
Goldwater-William Nichols Act, which legislatively
dictated FID as a core task for U.S. SOF.89
As will be noted in the examination of the State
Partnership Program, SOF FID operations are not a
panacea for SFA. FID is inherently much more limited
than SFA in the scale of the operation—based on the
precondition that a host nation must have or be capable of producing an IDAD strategy, both OIF and
OEF were not candidates for FID.90 This limited scale
enables SOF to conduct FID given the finite number of
SOF, but as highlighted in the earlier section’s discussions of the USASOC operating concept, implies that
there will never be enough SOF to act everywhere,
thus necessitating the need for CF to take on the SFA
mission. However, the value in examining the SOF
role in FID is to highlight the importance of advisor
expertise and cultural understanding in an existing
Army structure for SFA.
Demonstrating the critical role that enduring relationships can have in working with partner militaries,
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the National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP)
is another existing program deserving of examination.
Created as a U.S. national initiative for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Partnership for
Peace program in 1994, SPP initially sought to “provide opportunities for non-NATO countries to create
a foundation for full participation in a shared environment of regional and international military, political,
and economic activities.”91 With the focus of operations shifting to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
after September 11, 2001, the SPP mission remained
relatively unchanged as U.S. European Command
(EUCOM) was able to call upon National Guard forces
despite losing many of its assigned forces to the fights
in Iraq and Afghanistan.92 By 2010, SPP had expanded
to partner 62 countries with 47 states, two territories,
and the District of Columbia.93
A central reason for the success of SPP missions is
that, because they draw from National Guard units,
they have much greater personnel stability in their
ranks compared to their Active Duty counterparts.
This means the same soldiers often return to work with
their host nation on multiple occasions—one extreme
example is that of former Adjutant General in Illinois
Major General William Enyart who worked with Polish security forces in the SPP from the time he was
a junior lieutenant colonel and went on to maintain
relationships with many Polish senior leaders military
as a general officer.94
These military-to-military exchanges in the SPP almost always included people on both sides who had
participated before, allowing for a degree of continuity
but also enhancing understanding of culture, capabilities, and the importance of long-term relationships.95
As the program expanded beyond military-to-military
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partnerships, SPP was able to fund and train nonmilitary events, drawing on the significant experience in
the National Guard on disaster relief and cooperation
with civilian authorities, expertise not generally present in the active duty Army.96 Maryland eventually
expanded the program to include sister cities, where
mayors of 10 towns in Maryland worked with Estonian mayors to talk about provision of services.97 The
key lesson relevant to the Army in conducting SFA
missions is the importance of enduring relationships
with partner and allied nations.
The SPP is also not a cure-all model for working
with FSF. For instance, Ohio was partnered with Hungary in large part due to a large Hungarian population
residing in Ohio; this type of situation is not transferable to the Active Army.98 Additionally, funding for
civilian security cooperation is complicated, as it is
executed under Title 22 USC, whereas military-tomilitary is executed under Title 10 USC. SPP gets approval from U.S. ambassadors, the National Guard
Bureau, and the National Guard Annual SPP plan, and
resources come from a variety of sources to include
government agencies, NGOs, federal and state grants,
private sector organizations, and international agencies.99 The obstacles to Active Duty units conducting
military-to-civilian, and even military-to-military, operations under Title 10 USC are more complicated and
restrictive. SPP does provide, however, an example
of the value of enduring relationships between U.S.
forces and partner nations, a central goal of the new
RAF policy.
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The Central Question: Can the BCT
Conduct Effective SFA?
Nagl argued in 2008 “the Army should create a
permanent standing advisory command with responsibilities for all aspects of the advisor mission—from
doctrine through facilities.”100 Nagl’s vision called for
an Army advisory command led by a lieutenant general that would oversee the training and deployment
of 25-soldier advisory teams organized into three 200team advisor divisions.101 This new command would
have primacy in all Army SFA missions, allowing it to
focus all of its efforts on building FSF. A similar proposal is found in Colonel Scott Wuestner’s argument
for the creation of a two-star “Security Advisory and
Assistance Command,” which would implement all
Army SFA programs. Similar to Nagl’s concept, Scott
Wuestner called for a 47-person advisory teams at the
division level and 25-person teams at the brigade and
battalion levels.102
Others contend that the BCT is the correct structure
for SFA, however. Colonel Philip Battaglia, commander of a prototype AAB in Southern Iraq from 2008-09,
argued, “the BCT structure has the built-in flexibility
to perform any assigned mission. There is no need
for wholesale force structure redesign.”103 Citing the
inherent agility and flexibility of the BCT, Battaglia’s
experience led him to believe that “the modular BCT
is the right organization to form the core of security
force assistance operations in Iraq.”104 This is in line
with the 2008 claim of then-Lieutenant General Peter
Chiarelli that “I don’t believe it is in the military’s best
interest to establish a permanent ‘Training Corps’ in
the conventional military to develop other countries’
indigenous security forces.”105 Instead, Chiarelli felt
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that SOF could continue with the FID mission, although noting that conventional forces should have
the inherent flexibility to transition to that mission,
should it become too large for Special Forces.
Other arguments contend the modular BCT is the
right formation for SFA, albeit with organizational
and cultural change within the organization. One major lesson evident in the Iraq example is for a culture
change to occur within the BCT so that it supports
the advisor teams, not to “fight” them on the battlefield.106 Another criticism of the current model is that
it provides inadequate doctrinal guidance to conduct
SFA; units tasked with SFA missions have insufficient
dwell time between deployments to organize, equip,
and train effectively; and that several manning and
training capability gaps exist in the AAB despite the
approved augmentation package.107 The next section
provides recommendations based on these arguments,
the lessons from Iraq, and likely future missions that
the Army will find itself tasked with so that it can best
optimize the BCT to effectively conduct SFA.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the examination of the key lessons
learned regarding SFA in Iraq—the need to get the
right people into advisory missions and the need to
achieve unity of command—as well as the previous
examination of current SFA models and the likely future operating environment, this section of this monograph will provide recommendations for how the BCT
can best adjust to SFA missions. These recommendations are based on the assumptions that the Army will
be called upon to conduct SFA missions in partner nations in the “Prevent” and “Shape” phases of conflict,
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that the BCT will remain the core formation for Army
operations, that the Army’s end strength does not
drop below 450,000 soldiers in the Active Army, and
that the vast majority of BCTs will remain stationed in
the United States. Any changes to these assumptions
would require a new analysis and likely prompt new
recommendations.
Considering this monograph’s earlier findings and
the earlier assumptions, the following recommendations are proposed, in order of importance, to maximize effectiveness within the brigade combat team
tasked with conducting SFA:
1. Expand regional alignment to more BCTs.
2. Revise the Army’s personnel system to stabilize
soldiers to units aligned to a combatant command
with which they have experience.
3. Where possible, align BCTs with Army Special
Forces Groups as well as combatant commands.
4. Create an Army Advisor Functional Area/Military Occupational Specialty.
5. Modify BCT structure by assigning “Army advisors” to increase SFA capacity at BCT and below.
Recommendation 1: Expand regional
alignment to more BCTs.
To truly make regional alignment of BCTs effective
in the realm of security cooperation, the Army should
consider regionally aligning the majority of its brigades with a combatant command. While these alignments are not sacrosanct to operational demand in crisis, the alignment would nevertheless serve multiple
purposes in making the BCT a more effective product
for the combatant commanders. The benefits of this
recommendation are numerous, but most important is
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that this proposal would build focused regional expertise at the individual and organizational level within
aligned units while also providing the potential for
lasting relationships between aligned units, their host
nation partners, and the combatant command headquarters.
First, aligning the majority of its active BCTs with
a combatant command provides the brigade with a
region for which it can focus its training, not just language and culture, but also on operations and tactics.
For instance, whereas a “light” infantry brigade combat team (IBCT), aligned with U.S. Pacific Command
(PACOM) or U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM),
might focus small unit training on jungle operations,
a more heavy, wheeled vehicle-based Stryker brigade
combat team (SBCT) aligned with EUCOM or AFRICOM could focus on operations in built up urban areas or open terrain. These units must still train to “Decisive Action” standards, the execution of a full range
of mission sets across the warfighting spectrum from
insurgents and criminal networks to near-peer heavy
forces. However, regional focus could help develop
specialized capabilities for the areas they are most
likely to deploy. The Hawaii-based 25th Infantry Division’s recent re-establishment of a “Jungle Operations
Training Course” represents some of the possibilities
presented by alignment with PACOM with regards to
training focus.108
More importantly, expanded alignment presents
the conditions for establishing permanent relationships with host-nation security forces in partner nations. While these relations will never be fully realized
at the tactical level due to personnel turnover, at the
operational and senior leader levels, there is a real possibility that, through rotating brigade staff level offi-
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cers and senior NCOs to joint exercises with partners,
personal relationships can develop, as was the case in
the National Guard’s State Partnership Program. At
the squad through battalion level, continued focus on
a region will at least develop regional understanding
of allies and their armed forces’ capabilities, terrain,
and operations, even if it is never possible to reach
cultural and language proficiency across the broad
spectrum of nations that make up a combatant command’s area of operations. An expansion of regional
alignment meshes with General Raymond Odierno’s
2012 remarks that:
the approach to accomplishing operational tasks
is by organizing around highly trained Squads
and Platoons that are the foundation for our Company, Battalion and Brigade Combat Teams, organized for specific mission sets and regional
conditions.109

Ideally, the expansion of regional alignment would
include providing combatant commanders with a mix
of the three types of brigade combat teams—infantry,
Stryker, and armored. Ultimately, the unit’s doctrinal
mission should “be foremost taken into consideration”
when aligning forces to a combatant command.110 For
example, in PACOM, operations in jungle environments with small elements are more likely to be the
norm than combined arms maneuver with tanks and
other heavy vehicles (with Korea being the exception),
necessitating a preponderance of aligned light IBCTs.
The same goes for a larger alignment of ABCTs or
SBCTs in AFRICOM, CENTCOM, or EUCOM. While
combatant commanders should be provided with a
mix of the three types of BCTs for regional alignment,
the realities of physical geography, the composition
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of host-nation security forces, and a realist analysis of
the composition and disposition of potential adversaries in the area of operations must all inform the right
“mix” of brigades aligned to a combatant command.
To maximize alignment of BCTs with combatant
commands, it is important to understand how the
Army manages its personnel and units under the
Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. Active
Army units are managed on a 36-month rotational
cycle in three force pools: 6 months in the RESET pool,
focused on unit reconstitution after a deployment and
on limited individual training; 18 months in the Train/
Ready pool, focused on increasing readiness and capabilities in preparation for moving to the Available
pool; and 9 months in the Available Force pool, where
units are at the highest state of readiness and are available for sourcing operational requirements.111 This
1:3 ratio of “boots the on ground” time deployed to
nondeployed, or “Dwell” time exists in “steady-state”
rotation where supply of forces in the Available Force
Pool exceeds mission demands; in a “surge rotation,”
the rotation drops to 1:2.112
Given other operational demands, not all BCTs
can, or should, be continuously regionally aligned.
With the deactivation of the Army’s last standing BCT
stationed in South Korea in the summer of 2015, the
Army will begin to fill that requirement with a rotational Armored BCT. Additionally, in 2012 the Army
agreed to allocate a rotational U.S.-based Armored
BCT to the NATO Response Force.113 The Army also
fills the Global Response Force mission, a brigadesized element capable of achieving forcible entry into
a contested area within 96 hours of notice as part of the
Joint Operational Access Concept.114 Traditionally the
purview of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg,
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NC, the GRF is now augmented with stryker and armor companies, combat aviation elements, and other
additional assets.115 Given the need for rapid deployment within the GRF, it is a mission best suited for
the 82nd Airborne, and it is critical to identify these
augmenting elements and get them to train with them
prior to assuming this mission.
Another factor to be considered in this proposal
is accepting the reality of resources and threats, and
thus treating some combatant commands as economy
of force missions. National security strategy dictates
that PACOM and CENTCOM will remain high emphasis areas requiring continued presence of rotational forces. Those two combatant commands should be
prioritized for alignment of conventional forces. One
potential solution is to draw upon the National Guard
and its already existing State Partnership Program
in many of the nations in SOUTHCOM and EUCOM
rather than aligning a large number of Active Army
brigades with them, although continued Russian aggressiveness is likely to necessitate a larger continued
Active Duty presence in EUCOM.
Finally, it is important to note that this proposal is
based on the current operational requirements facing
the Army and on the 2014 QDR’s guidance that the
Army will no longer be sized to conduct long-duration stability operations. The onset of a major conflict
in any of the combatant commands would therefore
necessitate pulling units from outside the regionally
aligned pool of brigades to meet the force requirement
demands of the combatant commander. Therefore,
the intent is not for these regional alignments to be
inviolable; the Army must retain the flexibility to deploy forces to deter and defeat enemies on land—its
principal goal.
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Recommendation 2: Revise the Army’s personnel
system to stabilize soldiers to units aligned to a
combatant command with which they have
experience.
A 2014 Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monograph, Creating an Effective Regional Alignment Strategy
for the U.S. Army, cites both SOF and the SPP as being
examples of building enduring relationships due to
their regional alignment and personnel stability. The
report contends that peacetime conditions “afford the
Army with opportunities to increase soldier assignment length, reducing the personnel churn so destructive to establishing and maintaining enduring human
relationships.”116 Building on Recommendation 1, an
Army policy shift to increase personnel stability in
combatant command aligned units whenever possible
could yield great dividends. A new assignment policy
that attempts to reassign most soldiers within units
aligned with the same combatant command would
enable soldiers to better achieve knowledge and understanding of their assigned region of operations,
and at higher echelons could even enable some of the
lasting relationships with partners that the SPP enjoys.
Therefore, soldiers need not stay in the same unit per
se, but could at least focus the majority of their career
“home based” or aligned with a specific region, yielding many of the benefits mentioned at the unit level in
Recommendation 1.
Currently, Army policy requires a maximum
4-year tour at a duty station in the United States, with
exceptions that occur based on professional education windows and other factors.117 While certainly a
degree of personnel turnover is inherent in all military
organizations to ensure personal and professional
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development, it also degrades the ability of regionally
aligned units to gain actual regional expertise and,
more importantly, to build enduring relationships. A
preferred course of action would be to do away with
“time on station” requirements and instead focus on
“time in unit.” This would enable soldiers to increase
their expertise in a region, while still ensuring they
meet their professional development windows. There
are several other benefits of this recommendation, as
it could possibly increase retention of the best soldiers
as they no longer have to move their families every 2
to 4 years, while also potentially saving the government millions of dollars in not having to fund soldier
moves as frequently. However, none of this can be
achieved unless the Army revises its reenlistment and
retention programs to encourage “home-steading”
without damaging soldiers’ careers.118
Creating an Effective Regional Alignment Strategy for
the U.S. Army also calls for the Army to redesign its
Force Generation Model, accurately noting that:
Instead of the incremental personal churn that allows
units to retain a modicum of institutional memory and
regional expertise, current ARFORGEN practices create ‘all or nothing’ units whipsawing in and out of the
proverbial ‘band of excellence.’119

The lessons the authors draw from this are that
the BCT should no longer be the centerpiece of the
force generation model and that certain sub-units
require a higher level of regional expertise than others, with these sub-units needing deeper expertise as
well.120 However, stabilizing personnel to an aligned
region would allow units to have a baseline cultural
understanding from their recent assignments within
the region, while still keeping BCTs on the ARFOR41

GEN cycle of 9 months deployed and 27 months training, thus keeping the BCT as the foundation of force
generation.
The SSI monograph’s authors accurately note that
entire BCTs are not likely to deploy under the RAF
model, but rather “certain sub-units.” However, by
limiting stabilization in an aligned unit to these subunits, they undermine the potential of regional alignment within the BCT. As displayed by the RAF brigades deployed in AFRICOM and units participating
in the “Pacific Pathways” program in PACOM, it is
not just specialized “sub-units” that are deploying to
RAF missions, but rather companies, platoons, and
squads. Therefore, a more effective course of action
would be the combining of Recommendation 1, align
more brigades with combatant commands, and Recommendation 2, stabilize soldiers in units aligned
with a combatant command whenever possible.
As General Odierno stated, well-trained squads
and platoons are the formations on which the Army is
based. In order for regional alignment to truly work,
more brigades must align with combatant commands,
and the soldiers in those aligned units must remain in
other similar aligned units to the greatest extent possible if the Army is to maximize the potential of RAF.
Recommendation 3: Where possible, align BCTs
with Army Special Forces Groups as well as
Combatant Commands.
With the exception of PACOM and BCTs currently stationed in Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington
State, and the two BCTs currently stationed in Europe,
there exists little natural geographic linkage between
BCTs and combatant commands. Lacking any physi-
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cal imperative to align units based on physical geography, one potential method of regional alignment
would be to align co-located SFGs with conventional
Army units. Not only would this drive direction for
regional alignment away from arbitrary assignment,
but also the BCTs could gain regional expertise from
the already-aligned Special Forces units. Additionally, based on FID being one of their core competencies, partnered BCTs could draw advisor lessons from
the Special Forces units before these units deployed to
a combatant command to conduct SFA. Lastly, pairing SFGs with BCTs would help ensure that SOF/CF
interdependence, a hard earned lesson of the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, becomes institutionalized, not
just in combat, but also in training.121
Active Duty Army SFGs are currently aligned with
all combatant commands except for Northern Command (NORTHCOM), responsible for North America.
With the exception of the 7th Special Forces Group at
Eglin Air Force Base, FL, all SFGs are co-located on
an installation with at least an Army division headquarters and two BCTs. The case of Joint Base LewisMcChord (JBLM) in Washington provides an ideal
example of the potential of this proposal. Home to the
Army’s three-star I Corps, two-star 7th Infantry Division, two Stryker BCTs, and multiple enabler units,
JBLM is also home to the 1st SFG. Both I Corps and
1st SFG are aligned with PACOM, and elements of
the 2nd Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division have
participated in recent “Pacific Pathways” exercises in
the Asia-Pacific, a sort of “unofficial RAF” mission.
This model could be extended to multiple other Army
installations possessing division headquarters, BCTs,
and SFGs, with several exceptions.
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While 3rd SFG and the 82nd Airborne Division
and corresponding BCTs are co-located at Fort Bragg,
the Global Response Force mission discussed earlier
could prevent the 82nd Airborne aligning with AFRICOM. Additionally, the 7th SFG, responsible for
SOUTHCOM, has no co-located major Army unit at
its post at Eglin Air Force Base. A potential solution
could be to align units that currently are not co-located with these SFGs but are in geographical proximity
to their installations in order to keep with the intent of
this recommendation.
This recommendation is not perfect, but could help
to provide regional training focus to brigades while
furthering SOF/CF interdependence. It also provides
the potential to pair each combatant command with
a habitually aligned division headquarters capable of
functioning as a Joint Task Force, while still leaving
four division headquarters available to either backfill
aligned headquarters for longer-duration operations,
or to “surge” in the event of unforeseen events. It provides a mix of brigades to the combatant commands,
albeit with some shortages that would have to be addressed, particularly in heavier forces in CENTCOM
and the disproportional presence of Stryker brigades
in PACOM.
The fundamental point of this proposal is that it
aligns SFGs with conventional forces already co-located on most U.S. bases. This will help facilitate habitual relationships between SOF and CF, which could
have the added benefit of drawing on Special Forces
soldiers’ regional and language expertise in their assigned area of operation, as well as helping train tactical level units in the BCTs at advisor skills necessary
for SFA.
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Recommendation 4: Create an Army Advisor
Functional Area/Military Occupational Specialty.
Currently, the only dedicated career path in the
Army that regularly deals with interactions with foreign militaries is the FAO functional area. Made up
primarily of field grade officers, FAOs are the Army’s
primary method of achieving security cooperation
missions, central to the “Prevent, Shape, Win” strategy.122 Specializing in cross-cultural capabilities, interpersonal communications, and foreign-language
skills, FAOs serve most frequently as attaches, security cooperation officers in U.S. embassies, politicalmilitary advisors to deployed U.S. commanders, and
liaison officers to foreign militaries.123 In this role,
FAOs focus at the strategic levels of advising to foreign militaries and governments and are regional
experts on military capabilities that help the United
States in building partner capacity. What they are not
is advisors to tactical and operational FSF.
Therefore, the Army should consider creating a
specialized career path for “Army advisors,” separate
from the FAO functional area. Focused on tactical and
operational advising, this specialized advisor career
path would ensure that advisor selection and training
would be based on more malleable traits of human cognitive ability.124 The focus for Army advisors should
be on expertise in imparting military knowledge to
members of foreign military force, not necessarily on
regional expertise—the mission of FAOs. Rather than
Nagl’s recommendation to create an entire advisory
command, this recommendation would create a cadre
of expert advisors who would be permanently assigned to BCTs to assist in both training and operations, as will be discussed in Recommendation 5.
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This functional area must be incentivized to ensure
that it draws top-notch talent for service as advisors. As
highlighted in the Iraq case study, a major issue with
the early advisory effort in Iraq was that the Army did
not treat service as an advisor as a career-enhancing
opportunity. In order for this proposal to be successful, advisors must be recruited from top Army junior
leaders. They should be able to shift between advisor
and competitive operational command opportunities
to ensure promotion and, potential advisors should be
offered additional incentives, such as advanced civilian schooling, for those selected. An elite cadre of advisors will only be successful if the functional area is
able to bring in the Army’s best young leaders, ensure
solid performance is rewarded with career opportunities, and provides incentive for the best to leave their
current branch temporarily.
The Army should also create a new Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) for NCOs that adds to the
Army’s advising capabilities. Given that tactical advising is inherently the business of NCOs, any new Army
advisor branch should heavily recruit senior NCOs,
particularly those from combat branches, to form the
bulk of its cadre. While officers are well-suited for advising staffs at the battalion level and above, the Army
would miss a significant opportunity if it did not seek
out NCOs to contribute to this effort. A major benefit
of this proposal would be that these NCOs could help
train units deploying on SFA missions on how to best
transfer expertise on basic soldiering skills to FSF. The
advisory effort in Iraq proved, and Army doctrine
recognizes, that even the best soldiers do not always
make the best advisors. With pre-deployment training on the best way to train FSF by an expert cadre
of Army advisors, regionally aligned BCTs tasked to
conduct SFA could potentially be much more effective
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than if they just attempted to transplant U.S. training
models onto foreign forces.
The infrastructure to begin to form an Army advisor functional area is already present in the 162nd
Infantry Training Brigade at Fort Polk. Currently, the
brigade “trains Advisor Skills, Combat Skills, and Security Force Assistance Skills to provide Army and
Joint Force Commanders with trained personnel and
units to build partner nation security capacity.”125 A
feasible solution for an Army advisor functional area
would be to institutionalize the 162nd as the advanced
training center for advisors, building their baseline
expertise in advising skills and SFA, as well as crosscultural capability, before assigning advisors to the
Army units.
The Army routinely has proved capable of modernizing its forces to meet the advent of new challenges. One needs look no further than the Army’s September 2014 creation of a cyber branch to counter that
threat as an example of the Army adapting to changes.
The Army already possesses much of the institutional
knowledge in SFA necessary to begin to stand up an
advisor branch in the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade.
By creating a full-time career path for advisors—and
thus ending the decades long practice of “hey you”
selections of advisors—the Army could go a long way
to developing a professional cadre of advisors whose
full-time job would be advising security forces at the
tactical and operational levels.
Recommendation 5: Modify BCT structure
to increase SFA capacity.
This monograph’s most far-reaching recommendation is for the Army to modify the structure of the
BCT to increase permanently its capacity for conduct47

ing SFA. Even the development of the AAB in Iraq,
while fixing many of the issues of unity of command
between the advisory effort and BCT, failed to achieve
what is truly necessary to ensure the BCT is effective at
SFA—tie advising to those who have the most contact
with FSF, the squad and platoon levels. If the Army
is to be effective at conflict prevention via SFA, the
Army needs the ability to get advisors to work with
squads and platoons well before their assumption of
an SFA mission, teaching soldiers at the lowest levels
advising skills.
The principal reason for any restructure would be
to create more effectiveness between advisory efforts
and partnered units. Although the AAB placed both
organizations under the same roof, issues with unity
of effort constrained the ability of American forces
to reach maximum effectiveness. Army doctrine on
SFA defines advising as “the use of influence to teach,
coach, and advise while working by, with, and through
FSF.”126 Partnering, on the other hand, “attaches units
at various levels to leverage the strengths of both U.S
and [FSF].”127 However, small units that would be
considered “partnered” forces are receiving cultural
training and then assuming an advisor/trainer mission. Unlike OIF, where large amounts of both advisors and conventional forces were present, future SFA
missions will likely place small units in direct contact
with FSF as their only point of contact with U.S. forces.
It is therefore imperative that elements within the BCT
selected for SFA missions are given adequate training
in advising FSF and that the right soldiers are selected
for these missions.
A potential solution would be to expand on Recommendation 4 and assign specially selected and
trained Army advisors not only to the brigade level,
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but also to the battalion level. While a cadre of field
grade officers and senior NCOs is absolutely necessary
at the brigade to ensure the ability to advise foreign
security force commanders and staffs at the brigade
and division levels effectively, it is also imperative to
get advisors to the battalion level. The presence of senior captains and senior NCOs, selected and trained
specifically as advisors and assigned to the battalion
headquarters with the mission of assisting company
commanders prepare their small units for SFA deployments, would go a long way in ensuring effectiveness in training FSF. These advisors would work with,
not replace, company level leadership to ensure their
soldiers are best prepared for their SFA missions by
providing advice and training as to methods to best
impart military training to FSF.
Additionally, these advisors could deploy as standalone force packages to SFA missions based on combatant commander requirements, or could augment
conventional forces and provide them with in-house
expertise on SFA, training FSF, and general advising
principles. In a way, they would serve as advisors to
the advisors. A benefit to this is that, unlike SFA structures proposed in FM 3-07.1 that place conventional
companies under the operational control of advisor
teams, embedding advisors within the BCT before and
during deployment will help ensure that these smaller
teams—company-sized elements and below—are able
to draw upon the expertise of subject matter experts.
This proposal builds on the previous four recommendations, institutionalizing advisors down to the
lowest level while maintaining focus on a geographic
region in order to best prepare conventional units to
conduct SFA missions. The key difference from the
AAB model is that, rather than receiving advisors upon
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receipt of an SFA mission, the BCT would have a cadre of advisors permanently assigned to it. Some might
argue that this is an unnecessary permanent change
to the organization of the BCT and that augmented
advisors are only necessary when a unit receives an
SFA mission. This contention runs counter to U.S. national security policy, however, which emphasizes the
role of the U.S. military in building partner capacity.
Assigning Army advisors down to the lowest levels
would provide the flexibility and expertise inherently
necessary to maximize SFA missions within BCTs and
could ensure that both tactical and operational advising by Army units are conducted to their maximum
capability, while still enabling the primary focus of
the BCTs to be that of fighting and winning in the land
domain.
CONCLUSIONS
In a 2014 interview, Nagl stated, “Regionally
Aligned Forces are a poor man’s Advisor Corps, but
they’re better than nothing.”128 His central idea is that,
while the Army remains institutionally fixated on defeating any ground force in conventional combat, it
also has a “responsibility” to advise friends and allies
around the globe.129 In reality, the Army cannot restructure itself as an advisory force, nor should it, as its
core mission remains to fight and win America’s wars.
This does not mean, however, that the United States
can wish away the ugly wars of the past decade. Strategic reality dictates that the United States will have to
rely increasingly on its partners and allies to fight on
their own to help achieve U.S. objectives. Therefore,
the Army must be better postured to help others win
in a complex world. This is where the central question
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this monograph attempted to answer comes into play:
How can the Army best organize, train, and equip itself to ensure it is more effective at SFA?
There are many lessons to be drawn from recent
experience. Examining the development of SFA in OIF
provides several key lessons in what to do—and not
to do—to achieve effective results in SFA. Primary
among these lessons in the imperative to get the right
people assigned to advisor duty, avoidance of ad hoc
creation of advisor teams, and ensuring that those
most talented are brought into this mission. Additionally, unity of effort must be achieved between the
advisory effort and the land-owning maneuver elements responsible for combat operations. The Army’s
eventual shift to centrally-selected advisors who were
given key and developmental credit for their advising
duties, coupled with the combination of the tactical
and advisory effort under the Advise and Assist Brigade in Iraq provide a model in adapting the organization to meet the challenges of SFA.
As the Army looks to the future, its RAF concept,
carried out principally in conventional BCTs, is likely
to be the tool it uses to conduct SFA. The Army cannot
afford to repeat the same mistakes of Iraq in future advisory efforts. Upcoming assistance to FSF will likely
not have the benefit of the more than 100,000 American troops present as in OIF, therefore SFA missions
will have to be more efficient and effective at training
partner and allied security forces.
There are several ways the Army can ensure that
RAF units tasked to conduct SFA succeed. First, it
should align as many BCTs as possible with combatant commands, giving commanders a regional focus
for culture, capabilities, tactics, and potential operating environments, while also creating the potential
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for recurring relationships with FSF while providing
GCCs with a predictable, tailorable pool of forces to
draw from. Second, it should change its personnel
management policies to enable soldiers to remain in
units aligned with a particular combatant command.
This would allow for greater regional expertise at both
the individual and organizational levels while also
enabling enduring relationships with FSF. It could
also have the benefit of greater stability for soldiers
and their families. Third, the Army should draw on
already existent co-located SFGs and conventional
forces on U.S. bases and formalize alignment between
the two as well as with combatant command regions.
This would build on the first two recommendations
while also having the benefit of drawing from Special
Forces’ expertise in training FSF based on their inherent Foreign Internal Defense mission as well as ensuring the degree of SOF/CF interdependence gained
during OIF and OEF does not disappear. Fourth, the
Army should create a new “Army advisor” officer
Functional Area and enlisted MOS. Different from
FAOs, Army advisors would be experts in SFA at the
tactical and operational level and would be skilled
in imparting military knowledge to FSF. Finally, the
Army should institutionalize and improve BCT capacity for SFA by assigning these Army advisors down to
the battalion and BCT levels. This would enable a BCT
to have its own in-house experts on training FSFs at
the tactical and operational level and would help commanders train small U.S. units in how to better train
and advise partner and allied militaries.
Taking all these factors into consideration, it is important to note that SFA is not a cure-all for building
partner capacity. Writing in 2009, former managing
editor of Small Wars Journal Robert Haddick outlined
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the “promise and perils” of SFA, asking several important questions regarding any potential SFA mission the United States will undertake in the future.
First, will the partner receiving U.S. assistance help
the United States with its objectives? One needs to
look no further than the troubles experienced with the
Hamid Karzai and Nouri al-Maliki governments to
recognize the challenge. Second, can foreign military
forces do the job? The collapse of the Iraqi army in
the face of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in 2014,
despite years of training and billions of U.S. dollars
spent in SFA, serves as a timely reminder of this fact.
Closely related is the question of whether the foreign
partner can sustain the military capabilities created by
U.S. security assistance. Questions about the Afghan
National Army’s ability to maintain U.S. equipment
after the American withdrawal serve as a prudent
warning here. Finally, Haddick asks if a U.S. security
assistance mission might create a “Frankenstein monster” that will later haunt the United States? Examples
too numerous to name come to mind in this respect.130
While these are strategic level questions that must be
considered at the president and secretary of defense
level, they bear continued relevance to advisors and
trainers on the ground conducting SFA.
There is another major factor to keep in mind with
SFA—effectiveness vs. accountability. U.S. forces historically have been successful at creating tactically effective FSF. However, security force accountability to
host nation governmental control is a strategic issue
that must be incorporated into tactical level advising;
long-term successful SFA depends on more than just
tactical advising. Therefore, SFA can be made more
powerful by encompassing military effectiveness, accountability, and reform as well as rule of law and
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integrity training, ultimately seeking to form norms
and standards of the legal framework that regulates
civil-military relations in a democratic system.131 If the
Army is to have a role in building partner capacity
in the prevention of conflict, the issue of accountability must be incorporated into how we train units and
advisors.
Finally, it is unlikely that any near-term SFA missions involving the BCT will resemble the scope of
OIF. The Iraq example was that of a defeated nation
that the United States was initially rebuilding, and
then became entangled in a civil war. Future SFA
missions, if conducted properly, will occur before the
onset of major combat. That does not mean, however,
there is no value in the SFA lessons from Iraq. The
Army consistently trains its forces for full-scale warfare, recognizing that if it trains to that standard, less
intense missions, such as COIN or SFA, will be achievable with focused mission-specific training prior to
deployment. This same logic can be applied when
looking at the SFA lessons found in OIF, and then at
how to apply them to more permissive environments
in the realm of conflict prevention.
What is certain is that the Army will again find itself in conflict in the future. Given manning and budget constraints, it becomes imperative that the Army
get better at helping others, as the Army’s operating
concept puts it, “win in a complex world”—SFA can
be a sound means of achieving this if done correctly.
OIF proved that the Army could conduct institutional
change to carry out effective security force assistance,
but only after years of inattention. The U.S. Army will
not have the luxury of the manning or budget it had
in OIF for future SFA missions, so it must be smart
about how it takes on this task, particularly in region-
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ally aligned brigades. In order to get better at helping
others secure themselves, the Army must get better at
SFA capability within its core formation.
The recommendations outlined in this monograph
are one method to help ensure that the organizations
inside the BCT are best manned, trained, and equipped
to conduct effective SFA at the tactical and operational
levels. While not meant to serve as the comprehensive
list or a “how to” for SFA, what this monograph has
aimed to do is to institutionalize SFA lessons from
Iraq and apply them to potential future missions. If
the BCT is to have a role in conflict prevention, SFA
principles and expertise must be institutionalized
within the BCT for these missions to be as effective
and efficient as the Army will need them to be.
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